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I guess some mistakes you never stop paying for.1 
There are many kinds of mistakes. One kind-a rational, well-intended 
act or decision resulting in unanticipated, negative consequences-was the 
focus of Allan Farnsworth's previous foray into the realm of legal angst. 2 
Another kind-an act or decision prompted by an inaccurate, incomplete, or 
uninformed mental state and resulting in unanticipated, negative conse­
quences-is the subject of the present book. 
* Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada Las Vegas. B.A. 
1985, Baylor University; M.P.P. 1987, Harvard; J.D. 1992, University of Texas. The author wishes to 
thank Andrea Jundt for her research assistance. 
I. THE NATURAL (Tri-Star Pictures 1984). 
2. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGRETTED DECISIONS 
(1998). 
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Like its predecessor, Alleviating Mistakes does not confine itself to con­
tract law, Farnsworth's home turf; it explores criminal, tort, restitution, and 
other areas of substantive law as well. As such, it paints on too large a 
canvas to capture its entirety in these relatively few pages. I will try to trace 
the outlines of the discussion, rearrange and synthesize elements to make 
the tableau easier to comprehend, and enhance certain aspects with supple­
mental material-all the while understanding that, just as a description of a 
painting is no substitute for seeing the original, this review is no substitute 
for reading Farnsworth's book. 
I. DEFINING AND DELINEATING "MISTAKE" 
Sam: About a week ago, I accidentally slept with a prostitute. 
Toby: I don't understand. Did you trip over something ?3 
Farnsworth envisions a mistake arising from a "flawed perception of re­
ality" (p. 1 4). Viewing mistake this way reflects "the gap between . . .  the 
process of perception and . . .  the process of decision. During this gap, one 
acquires beliefs, draws inferences, formulates predictions and opinions, 
makes judgments, forms intentions, and ultimately arrives at a state of mind 
that is entirely distinct from initial perceptions" (p. 20). Absent a flawed 
perception of reality, there is no mistake, only an accident. "An accident 
occurs when an event causes a consequence that is unexpected and in most 
cases untoward, but there is generally no flawed perception."4 In common 
parlance, accidents happen; people make mistakes. 
Not every flawed perception of reality gives rise to a mistake. Irrational 
perceptions, particularly those attributable to mental illness or defect, will 
not relieve a party of liability based on mistake, although the mental illness 
or defect itself may be a separate defense. 6 
3. The West Wing: Post Hoc, Ergo Propter Hoc (NBC television broadcast Sept. 29, 1999). 
4. P. 21 (footnote omitted). Farnsworth appears to pull his punch by describing an accident 
as "generally" not involving a flawed perception of reality. If flawed perception plus mishap is 
Farnsworth's formula for a mistake, then allowing that some "accidental" mishaps might be accom­
panied by flawed perceptions seems equivalent to saying that some accidents are mistakes. That may 
well comport with everyday usage, seep. 21 n.15 ("In common parlance, the word accident is often 
used in a broader sense to include mishaps that result from mistakes, as where a collision resulting 
from a driver's having mistaken the significance of a traffic light is described as an 'accident.'"), but 
it undercuts Famsworth's painstaking effort to define "mistake" and to distinguish mishaps caused 
by mistake from other mishaps, see pp. 19-22. 
5. P. 21. Farnsworth offers the example, from Verdi's La Forza del Destina, of an unwilling 
(and unwitting) Don Alvaro, who threw down his dueling pistol, which fired upon hitting the 
ground, mortally wounding the man with whom he refused to duel in the first place. Farnsworth 
declares the Marchese di Calatrava's killing to be accidental, rather than mistaken, because Don 
Alvaro intentionally threw down the pistol but neither intended nor foresaw the untoward conse­
quence that the pistol would discharge, striking the Marchese. See id. (discussing GIUSEPPE VERDI, 
LA FoRZA DEL DESTINO act 1). By contrast, what The West Wing's Sam Seaborn described to Toby 
Ziegler as an accident, supra note 3, was actually a mistake. Sam did not accidentally sleep with a 
prostitute; rather, he slept with a woman whom he perceived to not be a prostitute. 
6. See pp. 24-25. Thus, Oliver Sacks's titular patient who, despite good eyesight and a high 
degree of intelligence, routinely perceived what he saw as being something else and could only 
identify individuals by some unique characteristic of their appearance or personal effects, see 
May 2006] To Err is Human 1409 
A. Perception and Reality 
For Farnsworth, the law imagines a mistaken person forming a "sen­
tence in her head" about what she perceives.7 This sentential approach, 
while obviously an oversimplified construct, "enables judges to formulate 
instructions that can be comprehended by jurors and to draft opinions that 
will be understood by judges in later cases" (p. 25). 
Perception may be active or passive. Active perception results from "ac­
tual contemplation" (p. 25). In Sherwood v. Walker,8 the majority found that 
a cow's buyer and seller actively perceived her to be barren and worth only 
$80, instead of fertile and worth between $750 and $1,000. Because the 
mistake "affected the substance of the whole consideration," the court held 
that "there was no contract to sell or sale of the cow as she actually was."9 
Passive perception is "a tacit or implied presupposition in the minds of 
the contracting parties." 10 "It is enough if one can say of a supposed fact, 'I 
did not have the supposed fact in mind at the time, but I could have called it 
to mind.' " 1 1  In Gould v. Board of Education,1 2  the Board notified Gould that 
it was denying her tenure but that her file would not reflect the denial if she 
resigned. Neither she nor the Board realized that she had already achieved 
tenure-by-estoppel. Gould resigned. Finding that both parties implicitly be­
lieved that Gould did not have tenure at the time of the Board's decision, the 
New York Court of Appeals held that Gould was entitled to rescind her res­
ignation and resume her teaching duties with tenure.13 
If mistake is a flawed perception of reality, what is "reality" for purposes 
of determining whether a mistaken party misperceived it? Sometimes what 
OLIVER SACKS, THE MAN WHO MISTOOK His WIFE FOR A HAT AND OTHER CLINICAL TALES 8-19 
(HarperPerennial Edition 1990) (1970), could not avoid, on the basis of mistake, a contract he en­
tered into with Lucy because he misperceived Lucy to be Snoopy. However, he might avoid the 
contract because the mental defect that caused him to mistake a girl for a beagle deprived him of 
sufficient capacity to contract. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(l)(a) (1979). 
7. P. 25. Farnsworth uses the example of philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche boarding a train 
that he thought was bound for Turin, only to end up in Genoa instead: "Nietzsche perceives that the 
train he is boarding is the train for Turin" is taken to mean "Nietzsche perceives 'The train I am 
boarding is the train for Turin.' " Id. 
8. 33 N. W. 919 (Mich. 1887). 
9. Id. at 924; see also Alan E. Garfield, Basic Assumption (A Poem Based on Sherwood v. 
Walker), 57 SMU L. REV. 137 (2004) ("The man with a cow . . . .  sold his cow for just chow be­
cause he didn't know his cow had a cow. Had his cow had a cow it would have been worth a thou 
and would not have sold for just chow."). The dissent found the contract to be enforceable because 
both parties perceived her to be without calf when sold. See Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N. W. 919, 925 
(Mich. 1887) (Sherwood, J., dissenting). 
10. Canadian Indus. Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar Molasses Co., 179 N.E. 383, 384 (N.Y. 1932) 
(Cardozo, J.). 
1 1 . P. 26. Thus, when Nietzsche boarded the Genoa train, supra note 7, "he could have had a 
passive perception that the train was bound for Turin . . . .  He could have called to mind the sup­
posed fact that the train was bound for Turin, for his mind was not a complete blank as to its 
destination." P. 26. 
12. 616 N.E.2d 142 (N.Y. 1993). 
13.  See id. at 145-46 ("[T]he resignation was submitted and accepted under a fundamental 
misassumption as to the position petitioner was relinquishing."). 
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is really more a matter of when: "One can be mistaken as to a fact even 
though, at the time, the truth or falsity of the fact cannot be determined."14 
That said, "[a]lthough reality need not be knowable at the time of the flawed 
perception, it must be provable at the time that the effect of the mistake is to 
be determined."15 
At other times, reality is a matter of opinion. Farnsworth treats all man­
ner of opinion-based mistakes as being akin to mispredictions, rather than 
factual mistakes, and categorically less worthy of relief. To illustrate, 
Farnsworth distinguishes between the true identity of the creator of a work 
of art (authenticity) and the opinion of experts as to the creator's identity 
(attribution). 1 6  Whether Edgar Degas painted a particular canvas is an immu­
table matter of fact-perhaps an undiscoverable fact or a fact that can only 
be discovered at a later date, but an immutable fact no less. Whether experts 
attribute the painting to Edgar Degas is also a matter of fact, but not of im­
mutable fact; ultimately, it is a fact based on an opinion. A mistake as to 
authenticity-whether based on a party's own observation or on an expert's 
representation-is a mistake of fact because it represents a flawed percep­
tion of reality.11 A mistaken attribution is not a mistake of fact because it is 
nothing more than an erroneous opinion.18 Nor is an accurate perception of 
who experts consider to be the artist a mistake of fact--even if the experts 
are wrong-because there is no gap between the perception of who experts 
consider to be the artist and the reality of who experts consider to be the 
artist.19 
14. P. 27. Farnsworth offers the example of Ptolemy's perception of a geocentric universe, 
which was neither provable nor disprovable at the time, but which Copernicus later disproved. See 
pp. 27-28. See generally NICOLAUS COPERNICUS, ON THE REVOLUTION OF HEAVENLY SPHERES 
(A.M. Duncan trans., Harper & Row Publishers Inc. 1976) ( 1543). 
15. P. 29. The indeterminacy of a perception's truth or falsity at the time a party perceives it 
may be because the perception is, or is based on, a prediction of some future event. See infra notes 
27-32 and accompanying text. 
16. See pp. 28-29. 
17. See JESSICA L. DARRABY, ART, ARTIFACT, AND ARCHITECTURE LAW§ 4:26 (2005) ("Au­
thenticity is often inconclusive and evolutionary. Changes and developments in scholarship, 
methodologies, and technologies, as well as newly discovered documentary materials, factor into the 
equation."); see, e.g. , Balog v. Center Art Gallery-Hawaii, Inc., 745 F. Supp. 1556 (D. Haw. 1990); 
Dawson v. G. Malina, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (each finding one or more causes of 
action based on lack of authenticity). 
1 8. See DARRABY, supra note 17, § 4:26 ("One era's Rembrandt is another's studio attribu­
tion; one scholar's premillenia sculpture is another's twentieth century reconstruction. Bands of 
itinerant authenticators . . .  circumnavigate the globe 'de-attributing' works of certain famous art­
ists."). See generally Duncan Sheehan, What is a Mistake?, 20 LEGAL STUD. 538, 565 (2000) 
("Opinions cannot be mistaken, as they relate to matters where there are no definite right and wrong 
answers. In such cases we can only disagree."). 
19. See, e.g., Firestone & Parson, Inc. v. Union League of Phila., 672 F. Supp. 819, 823 (E.D. 
Pa. 1 987) ("If both parties correctly believed at that time that the painting was generally believed to 
be a Bierstadt, and in fact it was then generally regarded as a Bierstadt, it seems unlikely that plain­
tiff could show that there was a mutual mistake of fact."), aff'd per curiam, 833 F.2d 304 (3d Cir. 
1 987). 
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B. Modes of Mistake 
Some mistakes are mistaken expressions, whereby the parties to an 
agreement have, or the party making a transfer has, failed to accurately ex­
press-typically in writing-the intended terms of the agreement or 
transfer.20 Most mistakes are mistaken assumptions, whereby the mistaken 
party has a flawed perception of external reality.21 
C. Mistake versus Misunderstanding 
Farnsworth distinguishes a mistaken assumption from a misunderstand­
ing arising from a party's flawed perception of the other party's 
understanding or intent (p. 14 ). A misunderstanding is not a mistake, as 
Farnsworth uses the term, because merely misperceiving another's meaning 
does not prevent a contract from forming; rather "[a] court will almost in­
variably . . . find that the meaning of the language accords with the 
understanding of one or the other of the parties. The perception of that party 
then prevails" (pp. 14-15). 
Three aspects of Farnsworth's explanation and his accompanying dis­
cussion of Raffles v. Wichelhaus22 concern me. First, while he certainly may 
define mistake to exclude misunderstanding-a position supported by the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts23-Farnsworth overgeneralizes in writing 
that a misunderstanding will not prevent contract formation (pp. 1 4-1 5). In 
fact, a mutual misunderstanding will prevent contract formation. 24 Second, 
he oversimplifies Raffles by declaring that, "because there was no flawed 
perception as to any reality outside the minds of the parties, this was not a 
case of mistake as I use the term" (p. 15). Excellent historical research that 
predates this book by fifteen years reports that there were multiple ships 
named Peerless operating in and around England at the time the parties 
20. See p. 14; see, e.g., Belk v. Martin, 39 P.3d 592, 598-99 (Idaho 2001)  (reforming a writ­
ten lease agreement mistakenly requiring the lessee to pay the lessor $1 ,476.80, rather than the 
$14,768.00 to which they orally agreed). 
Despite Farnsworth's (flawed) perception that mistaken expressions are rare, see p. 14, Belk is 
only one of hundreds of reported decisions granting reformation or rescission due to a mistake in the 
parties' written expression of their agreement-in-fact. See, e.g., BrandsMart U.S.A. of W. Palm 
Beach, Inc. v. DR Lakes, Inc., 901 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Duong v. Salas, 877 
So. 2d 269 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Magnuson v. Diekmann, 689 N.W.2d 272 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); 
Ribacoff v. Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 770 N.Y.S.2d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); Heart River Partners 
v. Goetzfried, 703 N.W.2d 330 (N.D. 2005); Laredo Med. Group v. Lightner, 153 S.W.3d 70 (Tex. 
App. 2004); RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 96 P.3d 935 (Utah 2004). 
21.  P. 14; e.g., Local Mktg. Corp. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 824 N.E.2d 122 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2004) (holding that a lessee was entitled to be refunded overpaid rent, plus interest, because the 
commercial lease mistakenly overstated the square footage covered by the lease and the lessee's 
monthly rent was calculated per square foot). 
note. 
22. (1 864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Exch. Div.). 
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 6, §§ 20, 151-53 & ch. 6 intro. 
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 6, §§ 17(1)  & 20(l)(a); see, 
e.g., Merced County Sheriff's Employee's Ass'n v. County of Merced, 233 Cal. Rptr. 5 1 9, 528 (Cal. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Friedman v. Donenfeld, 882 A.2d 1286, 1291 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005). 
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made their contract for cotton "ex Peerless."25 Consequently, the parties 
could very well have misperceived external reality if each mistakenly be­
lieved that there was only one ship named Peerless. Third, while a contract 
may form-and, thus, contractual liability arise-despite a party's unilateral 
misunderstanding of the other party's meaning, what of the other types of 
liability that Farnsworth discusses throughout the book? For example, sup­
pose that the rightful owner of stolen property confronts the thief, who has 
the loot in one hand and a pistol in the other. If the owner says, "Let me 
have it," does the thief's misunderstanding of the owner's meaning affect his 
criminal or tort liability for shooting the owner rather than handing over the 
stolen property?26 Farnsworth provides no insights into the perceived or de­
sired effect of misunderstanding on criminal or tort liability. 
D. Mistake versus Misprediction 
Suppose that, after the 2005 World Series began but before the end of 
Game Four, I purchased a ticket for Game Six in Chicago, booked a hotel 
room, and bought a roundtrip airline ticket. Alas, the World Series did not 
return to Chicago,27 so I did not use my game ticket, I forfeited my hotel 
deposit, and I kept the airline ticket to exchange it for one on a future flight. 
I inaccurately predicted the course of the World Series; but, using Farns­
worth's definition, I was not mistaken because I did not have a flawed 
perception of reality. 28 
Whether a party may get relief from the effects of a misprediction ap­
pears to turn on the type of relief she seeks and the kind of liability from 
which she seeks it. A party seeking to be excused from criminal or inten­
tional tort liability because her misprediction prevented her from 
"knowingly" committing the crime or tort typically is excused, provided that 
she was not aware that it was "practically certain" her act would result in 
harm to another (p. 54 ) . A party seeking to rescind a contract or to reverse a 
voluntary transfer due to his misprediction at the time he entered into the 
25. AW. Brian Simpson, Contracts for Cotton to Arrive: The Case of the Two Ships Peer­
less, 1 1  CARDOZO L. REv. 287, 295 (1989) (reporting nine British and two American merchant ships 
named "Peerless" operating in 1863). 
26. This hypothetical is loosely based on a 1952 case that inspired a critically acclaimed 
movie. Confronted on a rooftop after a botched break-in, nineteen-year-old Derek Bentley, who was 
already in police custody, purportedly told sixteen-year-old Chris Craig "Let him have it, Chris," 
after a police officer demanded that Chris hand over his revolver. Chris shot and killed the officer, 
rather than handing it over as Derek allegedly wanted him to do. Derek was sentenced to death and 
executed for the officer's murder. LET HIM HAVE IT (Vermillion Pictures 199 1). 
27. The W hite Sox swept the Astros in four games in what may have been the most closely 
contested sweep in World Series history. See Rick Morrissey, After 88 Years, There 's Joy in Soxville, 
CHI. TRIB., Oct. 27, 2005, at C2; Richard Justice, No Tricks Left in a Magical Season, HousTON 
CHRON., Oct. 27, 2005, at A l .  
28. See p .  49 ("One may foresee the future but one does not perceive i t  i n  the way in which 
one perceives present reality. A prediction is not true or false in the sense in which a perception is 
true or false."). 
May 2006] To Err is Human 1 4 1 3  
contract or made the transfer typically is not able to do so unless he can cast 
the mis prediction as a present mistake. 29 
Although some prominent scholars have called for making relief equally 
available to a party seeking to undo a contract or transfer because of mistake 
or misprediction,3 °  Farnsworth finds the distinction between the two con­
cepts to be "entrenched in the law" (p. 52), supported by the notion of 
assumed risk,3 1  and consistent with the doctrine of conscious ignorance.3 2 
E. Ignorance and Mistake 
All mistakes involve some degree of ignorance--otherwise, there would 
be no gap between a mentally competent party's perception and reality.33 
However, a decision made in complete ignorance of external reality is not a 
mistake: "One who is ignorant of a fact . . . .  can have no perception as to 
that fact. Sheer ignorance of a fact, so that one cannot call it to mind, cannot 
be the basis of even a passive perception."34 Nonetheless, Farnsworth deems 
an erroneous decision based on ignorance to be as worthy of relief as one 
based on mistake.35 
The foremost obstacle to treating sheer ignorance as mistake in the case of 
a contract is contract law's reliance on objective manifestations of assent,3 6  
29. See pp. 49-5 1 .  For example, a party seeking to rescind a personal injury settlement 
agreement is far more likely to prevail if he seeks rescission due to some undiagnosed or incorrectly 
diagnosed injury than if he seeks rescission because a known injury resulted in more harm than 
predicted. The incomplete or incorrect diagnosis is a mistaken perception of the facts that exist at 
the time; the overly optimistic prognosis is a misprediction of the future consequences of the cor­
rectly diagnosed injury. See pp. 50--5 1 & nn. 1 4-15 (collecting cases); compare, e.g. , Dansby v. 
Buck, 373 P.2d 1 ,  6 (Ariz. 1962) (allowing a plaintiff to rescind a release because she and her in­
surer executed it "under a mutual mistake as to an unknown injury not taken into consideration 
therein"), with, e.g., Dietz v. Lopez, 879 P.2d 2, 4-5 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1 994) (refusing to allow a plain­
tiff to rescind a release when both parties knew that his wrist was injured but were "unaware of the 
true nature and extent of his wrist injuries"). 
30. See, e.g., Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contract 
Remedies, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (199 1); Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After 
Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 1 12 YALE L.J. 829 (2003); James Bradley Thayer, Unilateral 
Mistake and Unjust Enrichment as a Ground for the Avoidance of Legal Transactions, in HARVARD 
LEGAL ESSAYS 467 (Roscoe Pound ed., 1934). 
3 1 .  Seep. 52; see, e.g. , In re Darrell Creek Assocs., L.P., 1 87 B.R. 908, 9 14 (Bankr. D.S.C. 
1995); Corcoran v. N.E. lll. Reg'! Commuter R.R., 803 N.E.2d 87, 91-92 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). 
32. See pp. 52-53; infra notes 46--54 and accompanying text. 
33. Seep. 31 .  Nietzsche's misperception that the train he boarded was bound for Turin, su­
pra note 7, was arguably due to his ignorance of the train's true destination. See pp. 3 1 -32. 
34. P. 32; see also Sheehan, supra note 18, at 565 ("[A] mistake presupposes the existence of 
some belief, and when we are ignorant we . . .  lack[] any belief at all."). 
35. P. 31 (advocating that courts adopt a uniformly "straightforward approach under which 
ignorance generally has the same consequences as mistake"). 
36. See Keith A. Rowley, You Asked For It, You Got It . . .  Toy Yoda: Practical Jokes, Prizes, 
and Contract Law, 3 NEV. L.J. 526, 527-35 (2003) (discussing the objective theory of assent and its 
ascendancy over the subjective theory evident in Rajjles v. Wichelhaus, (1 864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375 
(Exch. Div.)). 
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which a party need not make knowingly.37 To get around this cornerstone of 
contemporary contract law, courts.have inferred mistake from ignorance38-
a practice Farnsworth considers disingenuous at best.39 
One particularly troublesome case is Wilkin v. 1st Source Bank,40 which 
concerned the sale of a cluttered house. Ignorant of the presence of valuable 
works of art amidst the clutter, the seller agreed to let the buyers keep any­
thing they found if they would clean up the house rather than require the 
seller to hire a third party to do so. The court held that the seller was entitled 
to recover the art because the seller and buyers "shared a common presup­
position" that the house was "cluttered with . . . 'junk,' 'stuff' or 'trash.' " 
Allowing the buyers to retain the valuable art works would result in a gain 
to the buyers and a loss to the seller that the parties did not contemplate 
when the seller agreed that the buyers "could clean the premises and keep 
such personal property as they wished.',4 1  
So  far, so bad. Now suppose that a party's ignorance is the product of 
forgotten knowledge, conscious ignorance, or willful ignorance. Courts42-
and a handful of state legislatures43-seem willing to treat a party's forget­
fulness as a mistake. This, despite Lord Esher's admonitions that "mere 
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 6 § 19 & cmt. b. 
38. See, e.g., D' Agostino v. Harding, 629 N.Y.S.2d 524, 526 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (reinstat­
ing counterclaim and reversing an award of summary judgment because the parties to a real property 
contract inaccurately recited the total acreage and "neither party knew the number of acres in­
volved" when they executed the contract). 
In some states, no such judicial gyration is required, thanks to salutary legislation. See, e.g .. 
CAL. C!v. CODE § 1577(1) (West 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-409(1 )  (2005); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 9-03-13(1)  ( 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 63(1 )  (West 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 53-4-9(1) (1990) (each defining a mistake of fact to include "unconscious ignorance . . .  of a fact, 
past or present, material to the contract"). 
39. See p. 34 (complaining that this "convoluted approach" of inferring mistake from sheer 
ignorance "bends of out shape" his carefully distilled definition of mistake discussed supra text 
accompanying notes 5-6); see also Sheehan, supra note 18,  at 565 ("[Ignorance] cannot be trans­
formed into a mistaken belief; there is no reason to take a lack of belief in X and make it a belief in 
not-X . . . .  "). 
40. 548 N.E.2d 170 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). 
41 .  Id. at 171-72. But wait a minute! The seller did not hire the buyers to clean out the 
seller's house, allowing them to keep whatever they could salvage. The buyers purchased the house 
from the seller and saved the seller the expense of hiring a rubbish removal company by agreeing to 
clean the clutter themselves in exchange for keeping what they could salvage. The only thing that 
saves this from being a truly awful result is that the buyers apparently did not raise the clutter issue 
with the seller until after the sale had closed; therefore, the salvage value of the clutter was not part 
of the consideration for the buyers' purchase of the home, it was only consideration for the buyers' 
agreement to clear the clutter themselves rather than require the seller to hire someone else to do it. 
42. See, e.g. , In re Estate of Herbert, 979 P.2d 39, 65-66 (Haw. 1999); Bolle, Inc. v. Am. 
Greetings Corp., 109 S.W.3d 827, 833-34 (Tex. App. 2003). But see, e.g. , Andrews v. Blake, 69 P.3d 
7, 18 (Ariz. 2003); SDG Macerich Props., L.P. v. Stanek, Inc., 648 N.W.2d 581 ,  587-88 (Iowa 
2002); United Props. Ltd. Co. v. Walgreen Props., Inc., 82 P.3d 535, 540, 543-44 (N.M. Ct. App. 
2003) (all holding that a tenant's failure to properly exercise an option due to forgetfulness was not a 
mistake entitling the tenant to equitable relief). 
43. See CAL. C1v. CODE § 1577(1) (West 2006); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-409(1 )  (2005); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-03-13(1)  (2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 63(1) ( 1996); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 53-4-9(1 )  (2005) (each defining a mistake of fact to include "forgetfulness of a fact past or 
present, material to the contract"). 
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forgetfulness" is not a mistake and that saying "I forgot" is not the same 
thing as saying "I am mistaken."44 Farnsworth seems content with courts' 
equating forgetfulness with mistake, subject to the other party's and the 
court's ability to test the merit of the party's claim of forgetfulness.4 5 
Sheer ignorance (blissful or otherwise) is one thing; conscious igno­
rance, coupled with a decision to ;roceed despite knowing that one is 
ignorant, is something else entirely. Why? Because "one who knows that 
he is ignorant is not mistaken, since he has no belief as to the existence or 
non-existence of facts."47 Or, to use Famsworth's terminology, a consciously 
ignorant party has no perception of reality; therefore, his perception cannot 
be flawed (p. 37). 
In Estate of Nelson v. Rice,48 the estate's administrators sold two paint­
ings at a public sale for $60, unaware that they were painted by nineteenth­
century American artist, Martin Johnson Heade. The buyers later resold the 
paintings for more than $1  million. When the estate sued to rescind the 
original sale, the court held that the estate could not recover the paintings 
because the administrators decided to sell them despite the estate's appraiser 
having said that she did not appraise fine art. 49 Why did this case tum out 
differently than Wilkin v. 1st Source Bank?5° In Wilkin, the seller had no 
knowledge of the house's contents. 5 1  In Rice, the administrators sold the 
paintings knowing that they were ignorant of the paintings' value. 52 
44. Barrow v. Isaacs & Son, [1891] Q.B. 417, 420 (C.A. 1890). 
45. See p. 36. 
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 6 § 154(b) (denying relief to a 
party who knows "that he has only limited knowledge with respect to the facts . . . but treats his 
limited knowledge as sufficient"); see, e.g. , Yancey v. Hall, 458 S.E.2d 121, 124 (1995). 
47. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION§ 6 cmt. c (1936); accord DAN B. Doees, THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 103 (2000) (writing that a person "who knows she does not know a fact is not mistaken 
about that fact at all"). 
48. 12 P.3d 238 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000). 
49. Id. at 241-42; see also p. 38 n.29 (collecting cases). 
50. 548 N.E.2d 170 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). 
51. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41. 
52. See Rice, 12 P.3d at 242 ("[T]he Estate was a victim of its own folly and it was reason-
able for the court to allocate to it the burden of its mistake."). 
Farnsworth offers a different explanation: 
[C]onscious ignorance confers broad discretion on a court . . .. Much depends on how the court 
expresses . . . the matter as to which that party . .. "treated his limited knowledge as suffi­
cient." The greater the generality with which the court expresses a party's ignorance, the more 
convincing the case for the doctrine's application. 
P. 40 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 6 § 154(b)). This explanation 
works well enough for Rice. The court asked whether the administrators assumed the risk that the 
paintings were by "an artist of repute" by selling them without first ascertaining whether they were 
by an "artist of repute" and answered "Yes." The court did not ask whether the administrators as­
sumed the risk of mistake because they did not know Heade was the artist. To Farnsworth, doing so 
would have "strained credulity." P. 40. What about Wilkin? While it might have strained credulity for 
the Wilkin court to ask whether the seller assumed the risk that there were valuable art works amidst 
the clutter in the house, why did the seller not assume the risk that there was something of value 
within? I return to the issue of notice: the Rice sellers knew they were selling framed paintings, 
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Conscious ignorance does not apply when a contracting party or a trans­
feror actively or passively perceives a fact-even when further investigation 
would have revealed that the perception was flawed.53 The appropriate reso­
lution of other cases in which passive perception abuts conscious ignorance 
is less obvious. 54 
Criminal law recognizes another exceptional category of ignorance: 
willful or deliberate ignorance, which applies only to crimes that require 
that the accused act "knowingly" and "assumes that there is reliable and 
readily available information" about an unknown fact that the accused pur-
5 5  posefully does not pursue. 
At the end of the day, how do we distinguish ignorance from mispercep­
tion based on uncertainty when "all perceptions are held in the face of some 
uncertainty?" (p. 39). Farnsworth does not offer any clear answer. Instead, 
he proposes an approach that moots the question: acknowledge that igno­
rance-qua-ignorance can justify relief in appropriate circumstances and treat 
claims of conscious ignorance as questions of assumed risk.5 6  
II. TAXONOMY OF MISTAKES 
Some of the worst mistakes of my life have been haircuts. 57 
Throughout most of the book, "alleviating" is not a verb prescribing a 
response to a party's mistake, it is an adjective describing certain kinds of 
mistakes. Farnsworth distinguishes between inculpating mistakes, which 
another person asserts against the mistaken party to hold the latter liable for 
whereas the Wilkin seller knew nothing more about the clutter in the house than that the buyers 
complained---a.fter they had purchased the house-that there was clutter. 
53. For example, in Riegel v. American Life Ins. Co. ,  25 A. 1070 (1893), Riegel took out a 
$6,000 life insurance policy on his debtor, Leisenring. After Riegel died, his widow exchanged the 
policy for a $2,500 paid-up policy, unaware that Leisenring, whose whereabouts neither she nor the 
insurer knew, had died before the exchange. The court held that she was entitled to cancel the policy 
swap and to receive payment under the original policy because "both parties acted on the basis that 
Leisenring was then alive." Id. at 1073. Unlike the sellers in Rice, Mrs. Riegel did not know that she 
lacked relevant knowledge and choose to treat her incomplete knowledge as sufficient. "[W]hether 
Leisenring was then dead or not never entered into the contemplation of either party." Id. 
54. See pp. 39-42. 
55. See pp. 42-43; MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 9 ( 1962); see, e.g. , United States v. 
Sdoulam, 398 F.3d 981, 993 (8th Cir. 2005). See generally Robin Charlow, Wilful Ignorance and 
Criminal Culpability, 70 Tux. L. REV. 1351 (1992); Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: Delib­
erate Ignorance as Criminal Mens Rea, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 19 1 ( 1990). 
56. P. 44. As a consequence of adopting this suggestion, "[t]he availability of relief in dis­
putes arising under agreements and out of dispositions by transfer . . . would not tum on . . .  
inferring mistake from ignorance . . . [but would be] subject to the important limitation imposed by 
the doctrine of conscious ignorance." Id. Furthermore, the conscious ignorance doctrine "would be 
significantly improved by replacing the rationale that there is no mistake with a rationale that turns 
on allocating the risk of the ignorance"-something that the draft Restatement (Third) of Restitution 
and Unjust Enrichment "wisely" advocates. Pp. 44-45; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION 
AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT§ 5 cmt. b(3) (Tentative Draft No. l ,  2001). 
57. THE DooRS (TriStar Pictures 1991). 
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some act or decision,58 and alleviating mistakes, which a mistaken party as­
serts to avoid liability for some act or decision. 59 The two classes are not 
mutually exclusive.6() Farnsworth focuses his attention on alleviating mis­
takes, as will I. 
Liability that requires "consent, intention, or motive"61 raises the possi­
bility that a person who might appear to consent, intend, or desire might so 
appear only due to some mistake on her part. Had she been aware of her 
mistake before she acted, she would not have agreed to sell a fertile cow for 
the going price of a barren cow,6 2 to contract with a principal who could not 
be bound by the purported agent with whom she was dealing,63 or to contract 
with an imposter;64 she would not have paid money not owed65 or excluded a 
person from among the beneficiaries of her will because she thought him 
dead;66 she would not have fired the pistol she thought was not loaded67 nor 
operated on the wrong knee.68 Thinking that the fertile cow was barren, the 
false agent was authorized, and so on, are all alleviating mistakes, which 
might entitle the mistaken party to relief. 
58. Pp. 7, 17-18, 65--Q9. In leaving poisoned wine intended for Hamlet on a common table 
and failing to prevent Gertrude from drinking it, Claudius made inculpating mistakes. Hamlet seized 
upon those mistakes, along with Claudius's murder of Hamlet's father and poisoning of Laertes's 
blade, to hold Claudius liable in a most immediate and final way. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, 
HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act V, SC. 2 (Philip Edwards ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1985). 
59. Pp. 1, 9-12. By contrast, when England killed Rosencrantz and Guildenstem instead of 
Hamlet because Hamlet had replaced his own execution order with one for his companions, Eng­
land's mistake was an alleviating one, particularly in light of the extent to which England was 
beholden to Denmark. See SHAKESPEARE, supra note 58, act V, SC. 2. See generally TOM STOPPARD, 
ROSENCRANTZ & GUILDENSTERN ARE DEAD (1967). 
60. P. 18 ("An alleviating mistake is sometimes also an inculpating mistake, entitling one to 
forgiveness for an intentional wrong but resulting in accountability for carelessness."). 
61. P. 2 (quoting Thomas v. R, (1937) 59 C.L.R. 279, 299). 
62. See Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919, 923 (Mich. 1887). 
63. See, e.g., Robertson v. C.O.D. Garage Co., 199 P. 356, 358 (Nev. 1921). 
64. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Audubon Ford/Audubon Imps., Inc., 903 So. 2d 486, 491 (La. Ct. 
App. 2005). See generally D.W. McLauchlan, Mistake of Identity and Contract Formation, 21 J. 
CONT. L. 1 (2005). 
65. See, e.g., Jameson v. Jameson, 700 N.W.2d 638, 644 (Neb. Ct. App. 2005). 
66. See, e.g. , Stevens v. Torregano (In re Estate of Torregano ), 352 P.2d 505, 516-17 (Cal. 
1960). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANS­
FERS§ 9.6(b)-(c) (2003). 
Most states have statutory provisions addressing the inheritance rights of children omitted 
from a will due to the testator's mistaken belief that the child is dead. E.g., ALA. CODE § 43-8-91 (b) 
(1991); CAL. PROB. CODE§ 21622 (West Supp. 2006); IND. CODE ANN.§ 29-l-3-8(b) (West 1999); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2302(3) (West 2002); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 3B:5-16(c) (West Supp. 
2005); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 45-2-302(C) (1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-302(3) (Supp. 2005). 
67. See, e.g. , Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 766 A.2d 874, 877-78 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001). But 
see, e.g. , Dowda v. State, 776 So. 2d 714, 715 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding the defendant's 
'depraved heart' murder conviction because "a person's pulling the trigger on a weapon that has 
been placed against another's head, even when the first person believes the gun to be unloaded, can 
nonetheless be an act that is in utter disregard for life"). 
68. See, e.g. , Valerie v. Foret, 544 So. 2d 737, 738 (La. Ct. App. 1989); Duke v. Wilson, 900 
S.W.2d 881, 883 (Tex. App. 1995). 
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A party may seek relief only for those alleviating mistakes she discov­
ers-not, as Hagi Kenaan has argued, because no mistake exists until 
someone discovers it;69 rather, because the mistaken party will have no rea­
son to seek relief from her mistake until she discovers that she made one (p. 
1 3). However, she must not have taken too long to discover her mistake70 or 
waited too long after discovery to seek relief.71 Neither law nor equity re­
fuses to recognize a mistake that goes too long undiscovered or unreported, 
but law and equity may refuse to excuse such a mistake solely due to the 
1 f . 72 apse o time. 
Nor does a party need relief from all of her seasonably discovered alle­
viating mistakes; she needs relief only from those mistakes that cause 
unanticipated, negative conse�uences (p. 21). Thus, if a party who misper­
ceives another's true identity7 or another's culpability for some wrongful 
ad4 learns the truth before acting in reliance on her mistake, she suffers no 
real harm and needs no more relief than learning the truth. Likewise, a party 
who purchases a painting at a flea market, garage sale, or secondhand store 
only to discover later that it was painted by a renowned artist,75 or that it was 
painted over a more valuable painting or other document, 76 realizes a wind­
fall and needs no relief at all (except, perhaps, from negative tax 
consequences that might arise from later reselling or transferring by gift or 
devise the more valuable painting or document). Here, Farnsworth blurs the 
69. Hagi Kenaan, Subject to Error: Rethinking Husserl's Phenomenology of Misperception, 
7 lNT'L J. PHIL. STUD. 55, 58 (1999). This is, in essence, the classic "If a tree fell in the forest . . . .  " 
conundrum. 
70. P. 82; see, e.g., Nat'! Amusements, Inc. v. S. Bronx Dev. Corp., 676 N.Y.S.2d 166, 166 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Browning v. Howerton, 966 P.2d 367, 370-71 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998). 
71. See, e.g., In re IBP, Inc. S'holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 78 n.191 (Del. Ch. 2001); Cullins 
v. Foster, 171 S.W.3d 521, 532 (Tex. App. 2005). 
72. But see, e.g. , Allen v. West Point-Pepperell, Inc., 908 F. Supp. 1209, 1218-20 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995) (obviating the need for prompt action to rescind when the mistaken party has nothing of value 
that it would have to return upon rescission); Lyman D. Robinson Family L.P. v. McWilliams & 
Thompson, PLLC, 143 S.W.3d 518, 520-21 (Tex. App. 2004) (finding that an action to recover a 
$15,000 overpayment made under mistake of fact was not barred because the recipients of the over­
payment failed to establish that the payor "inexcusably delayed" in seeking to recover the 
overpayment and that his delay "unduly prejudiced" the recipients). 
73. Farnsworth gives an example from Mozart's The Marriage of Figaro, in which Marcel­
lina amorously pursues her son, Figaro, but realizes her mistake before it is too late to allow him to 
marry his true love. Pp. 9-10 (discussing WOLFGANG AMADEUS MOZART, Le Nozze di Figaro act ill, 
SC. 5). 
74. Farnsworth turns to Rossini's The Thieving Magpie, in which Lucia mistakenly charges 
her servant, Ninetta, with stealing silverware and sees Ninetta sentenced to death; after discovering 
the truth, she sets Ninetta free to marry Lucia's son Giannetto. P. 10 (discussing G10ACCHINO 
ROSSINI, La Gazza Ladra act II). 
75. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Mistake in Contract Law, 91 CAL. L. REv. 1573, 1636 (2003) 
(citing Peter Maller, Flower Power: Painting Transcends Garage-Sale Past, Brings $882,500 at 
Auction, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 27, 1999, at 1 (describing how a $29 estate sale purchase 
proved to be by renowned painter Martin Johnson Heade)). 
76. See Jon Waldman, A Fonune in the Attic: In Your House or at a Garage Sale May Be a 
Piece of An Wonh Thousands, WINNIPEG FREE PREss, July 17, 2005, at F lO (recounting how a 
woman discovered that a painting she had purchased had a significantly more valuable painting on 
the reverse side, which had been covered over with whitewash primer). 
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distinction between verb and adjective: "If no harm results there is no occa­
sion for alleviation."77 Moreover, even when unanticipated negative 
consequences do result, a court can only grant relief for an alleviating mis­
take if relief is within the court's powers. Again Farnsworth blurs the 
distinction between verb and adjective: "If a court can grant no relief for a 
mistake, no question of alleviation arises."78 Thus, a mistake that cannot be 
alleviated is not an alleviating mistake. 
Ill. RELIEF FROM ALLEVIATING MISTAKES 
[T]here comes a point when a reasonable man will swallow his pride 
and admit he's made a terrible mistake. The truth is I was never a 
reasonable man. 79 
The party seeking to avoid liability based on an alleviating mistake bears 
the burdens of invoking and proving the mistake and establishing his enti­
tlement to relief. 
A. 'Fessing Up 
Unlike an inculpating mistake, the existence or alleged consequences of 
which a mistaken party will typically try to deny or rationalize,80 denying an 
alleviating mistake is counterproductive. The mistaken party should plead 
"Mea culpa. Excuse me, for I did not mean to do it" (p. 69), and should 
" 'seek to set things right through the process of atonement,' a process that 
requires repentance, apology, reparation, and penance."81 
77. P. 10. And yet, while the mistaken party may have suffered no harm, can we truly say 
that no harm resulted from either operatic miscue? What of the emotional anguish a real-life Figaro 
might suffer from the attentions of his misguidedly amorous mother? Imagine a real-life Ninetta's 
suffering from being wrongly accused, deprived of her freedom, and sentenced to death. 
78. P. 12. Farnsworth quotes Lady Macbeth: "Things without all remedy should be without 
regard." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act III, SC. 2 (Nicholas Brooke ed., Clarendon Press 
1990). This is a curious choice for a literary reference because the act of which Lady Macbeth 
speaks-Duncan's murder-was not "without all remedy." Murder cannot be undone, but it cer­
tainly can be-and, in Macbeth's case, was-punished. See id. act V, sc. 8. 
79. BIG FISH (Columbia Pictures 2003). 
80. See pp. 65-69. 
81. P. 69 (quoting Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1801, 
1813 (1999)). Hamlet's declaration to Laertes on the latter's return to Elsinore fits Famsworth's 
formulation. Hamlet had killed Laertes's father, Polonius, by a blow intended for Claudius, which 
(compounded by Hamlet's renouncing his affections for her, as part of his plan to unveil Claudius's 
murder of Hamlet's father) had driven Laertes's sister, Ophelia, mad. Hamlet admitted his guilt and 
begged Laertes's forgiveness for the unintended consequences of his acts. See SHAKESPEARE, supra 
note 58, act V, sc. 2 ("Give me your pardon, sir: I have done you wrong . . . .  I have shot my arrow 
o'er the house and hurt my brother."). 
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B. P roving Mistake 
Notwithstanding the moral allure of the sackcloth-and-ashes approach, 
"tolerance of the mistakes . . . .  is not the norm when alleviation is sought, 
and reactions are often hostile rather than benign."8 2  
Professions of potentially alleviating mistakes are likely to be met with a 
jaundiced eye . . . .  There is something inherently suspect about an asser­
tion that is made in one's self interest and that is based on one's profession 
of one's own perception. Skepticism is encouraged by the essentially sub­
jective nature of the assertion and the consequent likelihood of 
fabrication. [M]istakes are . . .  "easily concocted after the event to cover a 
mere change of mind."83 
Except in criminal cases, 84 the mistaken party must prove that he made an 
alleviating mistake, on the basis of which the other party or a court should 
relieve him of liability. 85 
Recalling that Farnsworth defines a mistake as a flawed perception of 
reality, the challenge for the party seeking relief typically is proving that his 
perception was flawed at the relevant time, rather than proving what "objec­
tive reality" was then or is as of the date of trial. 8 6 This can be tricky 
business. "[F]or a legal system that generally favors outward appearances 
over internal reflections . . . .  an inquiry into a party's perception . . .  puts 
both the adversary and the trier of fact at a distinct disadvantage," (p. 75), 
often compelling them to rely more on circumstantial evidence than they 
. h h . 87 rrug t ot erw1se. 
82. P. 7 1 .  Consider Laertes's reception of Hamlet's aforementioned apology: 
[I]n my terms of honour I stand aloof; and will no reconcilement till by some elder masters, of 
known honour, I have a voice and precedent of peace to keep my name ungored. But till that 
time I do receive your offer'd love like love, and will not wrong it. 
SHAKESPEARE, supra note 58, act V, sc. 2. And yet, as he speaks these words, Laertes knows that his 
envenomed blade awaits the chance to strike at Hamlet. And strike it does-thus "wronging" Ham­
let's proffered love-and then strikes back at Laertes, bringing both protagonists to their end before 
any "elder masters of known honour" can hear Laertes's dispute and adjudge Hamlet's defense. Id. 
83. P. 71 (quoting PETER BIRKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 148 
(1985)). 
84. A criminal defendant "bears the initial burden of producing some evidence to raise a . . .  
mistake of fact, and once the defense is raised, the State bears the burden of persuasion to disprove 
the defense." In re S.S., 167 S.W.3d 108, 1 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The disproof need not be 
direct but may be implied from affirmatively proving mens rea. See, e.g. , United States v. Iron Eyes, 
367 F.3d 781 ,  785 (8th Cir. 2004); Ringham v. State, 768 N.E.2d 893, 898 (Ind. 2002). 
85. See, e.g., Hess v. Ford Motor Co., 41 P.3d 46, 52 (Cal. 2002); Smith v. First Choice Serv., 
580 S.E.2d 743, 748 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003); Williams v. Glash, 789 S.W.2d 261 ,  264 (Tex. 1990). 
86. P. 75 ("[T]he issue is not usually 'what is the true fact' but rather 'the belief of the parties 
in the supposed true fact."' (quoting Kirchgestner v. Denver & R.G. W.R. Co., 218  P.2d 685 (Utah 
1950), vacated on other grounds on rehearing, 233 P.2d 699 (Utah 195 1)). 
87. See pp. 77-78; see, e.g., Bishop v. Clark, 54 P.3d 804, 8 1 2  (Alaska 2002) (relying on 
evidence that the only property that could have been the subject of the parties' agreement was sold 
in February 1996 to reform the agreement, which referred to property sold "after June 7, 1976"); 
Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919, 923 (Mich. 1887) (affording great weight to the fair market value 
of breeding and nonbreeding cows to conclude that the parties must have mistakenly believed the 
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In light of  the skepticism that attends claims of  alleviating mistake and 
the difficulty that adjudicating such claims poses for our judicial system, 
Farnsworth expresses surprise-and, given that he devotes most of a chapter 
to considering "solutions," (pp. 76-84), one imagines some degree of dissat­
isfaction-that courts seem generally unwilling to impose a heavier-than­
normal burden of proof on the mistaken party seeking alleviation (p. 75). 
Indeed, Farnsworth implies a lighter-than-normal burden in cases in which a 
party seeks restitution of money paid by mistake.88 The only heightened 
standard he notes is in cases in which the mistaken party seeks to reform one 
or more terms of an agreement. In those cases, courts "have consistently 
applied a 'clear and convincing' standard,"89 rather than the "preponderance 
of the evidence" standard generally applicable to parties seeking rescis­
sion.90 Farnsworth finds no evidence of courts allowing the prosecution to 
negate a criminal defendant's claimed alleviating mistake with anything less 
than proof beyond a reasonable doubt (p. 77). 
Although courts have generally been unwilling to demand more exacting 
proof of mistake, and scholars are divided on whether courts should, Farns­
worth finds that courts have exhibited more of an inclination toward 
"covert" methods of requiring something more than the legal equivalent of 
"My bad"-particularly when the mistaken party seeks to have a transaction 
undone. Among the "covert" methods Farnsworth discusses are (1) barring 
claims of mistake that are not raised in a timely manner9 1  or that are couched 
subject cow to be barren because the price they set was a fair price for a nonbreeding cow but ap­
proximately one-tenth the value of a breeding cow); Williams v. Glash, 789 S.W.2d 261, 265 (Tex. 
1990) (holding that a prior settlement only covered the claimant's property damage, not her personal 
injuries, because the settlement was for the exact amount of the property damage to her vehicle, 
neither she nor the insurer knew about her personal injuries, and the insurer used a check code indi­
cating it was payment for property damage only). 
88. Farnsworth explains: 
If a debtor can prove . . .  that the payment clearly exceeded the debt, surely the debtor must 
have mistaken the amount of either the debt or the payment. If a debtor can prove that the same 
debt was paid twice, surely the debtor must have forgotten the first payment and made the sec­
ond by mistake. Absent some defense, such as detrimental reliance by the recipient, such 
claims are routinely granted. 
P. 75. But see, e.g., Eifler v. Shurgard Capital Mgmt. Corp., 861 P.2d 1071, 1078 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1993) (holding that, absent "at least slight evidence" of precisely when the bailor's car disappeared, 
the bailor could not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was entitled to a refund of 
any of the monthly storage payments he made to the bailee prior to discovering the car's disappear­
ance). 
89. Pp. 76, 79-80; e.g., Cerberus Int'!, Ltd. v. Apollo Mgmt., L.P., 794 A.2d 1141, 1150 (Del. 
2002); Fisher v. State Bank of Annawan, 643 N.E.2d 811, 814 (Ill. 1994); Heart River Partners v. 
Goetzfried, 703 N.W.2d 330, 337 (N.D. 2005); Easton v. Washington County Ins. Co., 137 A.2d 
332, 337 (Pa. 1957). 
90. See, e.g. , Lanum v. Shellans, 523 F. Supp. 326, 330 (W.D. Va. 1981); Benz v. New York, 
266 N.Y.S.2d 684, 684 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966); McGinnis v. Cayton, 312 S.E.2d 765, 770 (W. Va. 
1984). But see, e.g., Dennett v. Kuenzli, 936 P.2d 219, 226 (Idaho Ct. App. 1997); Brenco v. S.C. 
Dep't of Transp., 609 S.E.2d 531, 534-35 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) (requiring a party seeking to rescind 
a contract to prove mistake by "clear and satisfactory" and "clear and convincing" evidence, respec­
tively). 
91. P. 82; supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text. 
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in "vague and imprecise terms,"92 (2) limiting relief from unilateral mistakes 
to cases of mistaken expression93 (while allowing relief for both mistaken 
expression and mistaken assumption in cases of mutual mistake), 
(3) requiring that the mistake be about a "basic" assumption and not just a 
"material" one,94 and (4) tending not to excuse mistakes of law.95 Echoing 
Karl Llewellyn's admonition that "[c]overt tools are never reliable tools,"9 6  
Farnsworth finds each of the foregoing to be worth mentioning but none to 
be a significant impediment to a party who can legitimately claim an allevi-. . ak 97 atmg rrust e. 
C. Causation 
Causation in mistake cases involves a three-step inquiry. First, did the 
mistaken party's flawed perception cause her to make a faulty decision? 
Second, did her faulty decision prompt her to act or refrain from acting? 
And third, did her act or failure to act result in a particular untoward conse­
quence? (p. 85). While escaping liability due to an alleviating mistake 
requires proving-by a preponderance of the evidence, by clear and con­
vincing evidence, or beyond a reasonable doubt (depending on the 
context)-that the answer to all three questions is "yes," Farnsworth focuses 
his inquiry on the first step, as it is uniquely relevant to assessing the legal 
consequences of an alleviating mistake (p. 86). 
Contracts, voluntary transfers, many crimes, and many torts require in­
tent for liability to attach. We test intent at the time of the relevant action. 
Testing intent at the time of decision ignores the fact that, between decision 
and action, a party may change her mind-in essence, retracting her deci­
sion by not acting upon it. Therefore, a flawed perception can only negate 
92. P. 82; see, e.g. , Schaffner v. 5 14 West Grant Place Condo. Ass'n, 756 N.E.2d 854, 864 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2001); Best v. Ford Motor Co., 557 S.E.2d 1 63, 166 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001), ajf'd, 562 
S.E.2d 419 (N.C. 2002). 
Farnsworth cites Hattiesburg v. Cobb Brothers Construction Co., 1 84 So. 630 (Miss. 1938), in 
support of this proposition. However, Cobb Brothers is, at best, tangentially related-applying, as it 
does, to a public works bidder's right to rescind its bid prior to the award of the contract, in which 
context the mistaken bidder has an affirmative duty to inform the public entity of the specific mis­
take in the bid. See id. at 63 1-32; accord A&A Elec.,  Inc. v. City of King, 126 Cal. Rptr. 585, 590 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1976). No such duty to inform applies generally to a party seeking to rescind a con­
tract or voluntary transfer on the basis of mistake. 
93. P. 83; see, e.g., Wright v. Sampson, 830 N.E.2d 1022, 1028 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). 
94. P. 83; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 6 § 152 cmt. b; see, e.g. , 
United States v. Cieslowski, 4 1 0  F.3d 353, 362 (7th Cir. 2005); Hillside Assocs. of Hollis, Inc. v. 
Maine Bonding & Cas. Co., 605 A.2d 1 026, 1030 (N.H. 1 992). 
95. Pp. 83-84; see, e.g., Mills v. Equicredit Corp., 344 F. Supp. 2d 1 07 1 ,  1 077-78 (E.D. 
Mich. 2004) (voluntary payment); Foster v. Carolina Marble & Tile Co., 5 1 3  S.E.2d 75, 78 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1999) (contract); State v. Wallace, 124 P.3d 259, 262--63 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (unlicensed sale 
of securities). 
96. Karl N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 703 (1939) (reviewing Ono 
PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL 
LAW ( 1937)). 
97. See p. 84. 
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intent if the flawed perception persists "until it is too late to retract the faulty 
decision and not take the action" (p. 87). Furthermore, if the party retains 
the right and the ability to retract the action for some period of time, then 
the misperception must persist until the party can no longer retract the ac­
tion (p. 87). 
A flawed perception that negates intent relieves the mistaken party of li­
ability and moots the question of causation (p. 89). "This is true not only 
when a flawed perception negates the intent required for an intentional of­
fense but also where it negates the intent required for a consensual 
transaction" (p. 90). Whether a flawed perception negates intent depends on 
the type of intent required for a particular form of liability. Certain types of 
liability require action intent-the intent to take the action that caused the 
untoward consequence; other types of liability require consequence intent­
the intent to cause the untoward consequence.98 Voluntary transfers require 
the transferor's intent to pass ownership to the transferee (p. 91) ;  whereas 
consensual transactions require only the parties' intent to manifest assent.99 
How do we tell whether a mistaken party's flawed perception divested 
him of the requisite action or consequence intent? First, the flawed percep­
tion must result in a decision (p. 94 ). Second, the flawed perception must be 
a discernable cause of the faulty decision.100 This becomes problematic when 
the mistaken party acts for more than one reason, only one of which is the 
flawed perception from which he seeks relief. In such cases, the question is: 
"Did the flawed perception play a sufficient part in reaching the decision to 
meet the test of causation?"10 1  Farnsworth considers three alternatives for 
98. Pp. 87-89 (distinguishing between, inter alia, the tort of trespass to land, which requires 
only the intent to enter onto the land in question, and criminal trespass, which requires that the 
trespasser know that he has no legal right to be on someone else's land). 
Farnsworth elaborates using Glanville Williams's hypothetical in which a club member takes 
the last umbrella from the stand, thinking it is his, when in fact it is not, although he would have 
taken the umbrella even if he had not thought it was his. Suppose he was subsequently arrested and 
charged with petit larceny, which requires the intent to deprive the true owner of her property with­
out consent. Did he have action intent? Yes, he intended to take the umbrella from the stand and did 
so. Did he have consequence intent? No, he thought the umbrella was his; therefore, he did not 
intend to deprive the true owner of her property without consent. Williams agreed that criminal 
liability ought not attach, even though the accused would have taken the umbrella had he not 
thought it was his. See pp. 89-90 (discussing GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GEN­
ERAL PART § 70 (2d ed. 1961) ). Nonetheless, the umbrella thief would still be liable for the tort of 
conversion, which requires only action intent. See p. 90. 
99. See pp. 91-92; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 6 § 2 1 .  Thus, in 
Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887), discussed supra notes 8-9 and 87 and accompany­
ing text, any mistake that one or both parties made regarding the cow's ability to breed did not 
negate their required intent to buy and sell that particular cow at the agreed price; it "went instead to 
the underlying assumption that [she) was barren." P. 92. 
100. Sometimes, this is fairly obvious. See id. ("If the payor's decision to make the payment 
follows the debtor's flawed perception that there is a debt to be discharged, there is usually little 
doubt that it was the debtor's flawed perception that caused the decision."). At other times, it is 
not-as the discussion that follows briefly illustrates. 
IO 1 .  P. 95. Answering this question is made all the more difficult because "the inquiry is 
purely subjective, for what caused the decision depends on what went on in the mind of the mis­
taken person." Id. 
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determining causation in these mixed-motive cases: 10 2 attribution theory, a 
"but-for" test, and a "substantial factor" test. 
According to attribution theory, people "infer the cause of an action 
from what they know of the individual and of the circumstances." 103 Suppose 
a man has the habit of taking other people's umbrellas from his club. If he 
does so in a particular instance and, when confronted, protests that he mis­
takenly believed the umbrella was his, do we attribute his actions to his 
larcenous tendencies or to his mistaken belief? Attribution theory does not 
provide a clear answer. 
The butjor test asks whether the party would have made the same faulty 
decision but for his flawed perception (pp. 96-97). If the umbrella filch 
would have taken the other person's umbrella regardless of whether he mis­
takenly believed it to be his own, then we cannot say that, but for his 
mistaken belief, he would not have made the faulty decision. Therefore, his 
flawed perception did not cause his faulty decision. 
The substantial factor test "asks whether the flawed perception was a 
substantial factor in reaching the faulty decision" (p. 97). If the umbrella 
filch took the umbrella thinking it was his own (despite the fact that he 
likely would have taken it without the misperception), his flawed perception 
would appear to have contributed substantially to his faulty decision. Apply­
ing the variation of the substantial factor test that a plurality of the U.S. 
Supreme Court used in Mount Healthy City School District Board of Educa­
tion v. Doyle, 104 the umbrella filch need only prove that his mistaken belief 
was a (not the) "motivating factor" in his faulty decision to take the other 
105 person's umbrella. 
Farnsworth decries the substantial factor test as "infuriatingly vague, es­
pecially when applied to the link between perception and decision" (p. 95), 
and clearly favors the but-for test, despite the many criticisms leveled at it. 106 
At least in cases in which the claimant need only establish causation by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the but-for test is not demanding and claim­
ants rarely fail to meet it. 107 As is true when proving mistake, 108 proving 
102. It seems that these tests would be equally useful in ascertaining a party's hidden motive, 
regardless of whether the hidden motive is the sole or only a contributing one. 
103. Pp. 95-96; see Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions 
in the Attribution Process, in 10 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 173, 179 (Leo­
nard Berowitz ed. 1977). 
104. 429 U.S. 274 ( 1977). 
105. See id. at 287. 
106. See pp. 98-99 (arguing that some of the principal objections to applying the but-for test 
to the link between action and consequence do not hold when testing the link between perception 
and decision). 
107. P. 99; see, e.g. , State ex rel. Mathes v. Gilbreath, 1 8 1  S.W.2d 755, 757 (Tenn. 1944); 
Simonson v. Fendell, 675 P.2d 1 2 1 8, 1 221-22 (Wash. 1984). But see, e.g., United States v. First 
Dakota Nat') Bank, 963 F. Supp. 855, 859 (D.S.D. 1 997) ("There is no evidence, let alone any rea­
sonable evidence, to show that First Dakota would not have assumed the unknown tax obligation 
under all the circumstances. They would have assumed it and they did assume it."), aff'd, 1 37 F.3d 
1077 (8th Cir. 1 998). 
108. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
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causation often turns on circumstantial evidence and on reasonable infer­
ences drawn from circumstantial evidence (p. 100). In some cases, 
subsequent acts or inaction or the substantiality of a mistake will "reinforce 
the inference that the flawed perception caused the decision" (pp. 100-01). 
D. Relevance 
A causal link between a mistake and the untoward consequence is neces­
sary, but not sufficient, to entitle the mistaken party to relief. IO!l With certain 
exceptions, criminal, tort, contractual, and restitutionary liability are not 
absolute or strict; rather, they are subject to alleviation based upon, among 
other things, proof of a relevant mistake.1 10 An alleviating mistake is gener­
ally relevant only if the substantive law makes the mistaken party's mental 
state relevant. 1 1 1  
Most crimes and torts require scienter. For an alleviating mistake to be 
relevant, then, it must negate scienter. 1 1 2 The Model Penal Code and the Re­
statement (Third) of Torts distinguish between acting purposefully and 
knowingly: a party acts purposefully by consciously seeking to cause a par­
ticular result; a party acts knowingly if she is "practically (or substantially) 
certain" that her conduct will cause a particular result.1 13 Either is sufficient 
for most forms of criminal and tort liability. 1 14 Curiously, Farnsworth opines 
that mistake only affects whether conduct is knowing, not whether it is 
109. See p. 1 1 1 . See generally In re Jennings, 95 P.3d 906, 920 (Cal. 2004) ("As a general 
matter, . . .  a mistake of fact defense is not available unless the mistake disproves an element of the 
offense."). 
1 10. See pp. 109-10. Why? Perhaps because, as H.L.A. Hart wrote, we "value a system of 
social control that takes mental conditions into account," H.L.A. HART, PuNISHMENT AND RESPON­
SIBILITY 35 (1968), or because "if a legal system generally refused to allow" people to avoid liability 
for contracts formed or transfers made under mistake, "people might be too hesitant in making 
agreements and dispositions by transfer," p. 1 10. 
1 1 1 . But see, e.g., Jennings, 95 P.3d at 922-23 (holding that, while the prosecution was not 
required to prove scienter to secure a conviction on the charge of selling alcohol to a minor, the 
defendant was, nonetheless, entitled to raise as a defense his mistaken belief that the buyer was at 
least twenty-one years old). 
1 12. P. 1 12 ("[l)f 'an actor honestly and reasonably, although mistakenly, believed the facts to 
be other than they were, and if his conduct would not have been criminal had the facts been as he 
believed them to be, then his mistake is a defense if he is charged with a crime which requires 'mens 
rea.' " (quoting JEROME MICHAEL & HERBERT WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRA­
TION 756 (1940)). The key is the defendant's state of mind at the time of the offense; information 
learned after the fact is irrelevant to establishing an alleviating mistake. See, e.g., Doe v. United 
States, 666 F.2d 43, 48 (4th Cir. 198 1 ). 
1 1 3.  MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 55, § 2.02(2)(a)-(b); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 1 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 ,  2005). The Model Penal Code uses 
the linguistically unfortunate term "purposely." In common parlance, a person does not act "pur­
posely," she aclS "on purpose," "with purpose," or "purposefully." Older editions of Black 's Law 
Dictionary favored "purposely" over "purposefully." See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1 1 12 (5th 
ed. 1979). More recent editions define neither, but define "purpose" and "purposeful" in such a way 
that suggests "purposefully" is the preferred current usage. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 
127 1-72 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed. 2004). 
1 14. P. 1 1 3; MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 55 § 2.02(2)(a)-(b). 
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purposeful. 1 15 If he is correct, the law would not excuse a mistaken party for 
a purposeful action. However, Famsworth's position is at odds with the 
Model Penal Code, which recognizes a mistake as a defense to criminal li­
ability if it "negatives the purpose, knowledge, belief, recklessness or 
negligence required to establish a material element of the offense." 1 16 A 
flawed perception will not excuse the mistaken party if, had the facts been 
as he perceived them to be, he would still have been guilty of the crime or 
tort of which he stands accused. 1 1 7 Nor will a flawed perception excuse a 
mistaken party if it relates to a nonmaterial element of the crime or tort 
(p. 114). 
With respect to voluntary transfers and contracts, the question is 
"whether the mistake . . .  impair[ed] the mistaken party's judgment so . . . as 
to justify relief' (p. 1 15). The Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust 
Enrichment authorizes rescinding a voluntary transfer if a mistake "frus­
trates or obstructs the normal exercise of [the transferor's] judgment." 1 18 
Must the transferor's frustrated or obstructed judgment unjustly enrich the 
transferee (or a third party)? Must any unjust enrichment be at the trans­
feror's expense? Farnsworth answers the first question with a definitive 
"No." His answer to the second question is more equivocal. 1 19 A transferor's 
mistaken belief that she owes the money transferred is sufficient, but not 
necessary, to justify relief. Provided that the transferor does not bear the risk 
of mistake, any mistake that causes her to make the transfer gives rise to a 
prima facie right to reverse the transfer, 1 20 which the transferee must over­
come by proving that the transferor did not act based on mistake (p. 121). 
On the other hand, there is no mistake if, "in a spirit of compromise, one 
pays a debt in the face of uncertainty as to whether it is owed" (p. 121) .  
Rescinding a contract or other agreement is more complicated because 
we must account for the ex ante intent of someone other than the mistaken 
1 15. P. 1 13 .  Thus, "[t]he mistake must negate the doctor's awareness that the action would be 
practically certain to have the consequence of causing 'the death of another human being.' " Id. 
1 16. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 55 § 2.04( l )(a) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., United 
States v. Ruiz, 59 F.3d 1 15 1 ,  1 154 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1995) (holding that the defendant may have lacked 
criminal intent, despite knowingly participating in the purchase of a large quantity of cocaine, if she 
genuinely believed the person she was aiding was an undercover government agent). 
1 17.  P. 1 14. Thus, when Hamlet slew Polonius (who was hiding behind an arras), mistakenly 
believing him to be Claudius, see SHAKESPEARE, supra note 58, act ill, sc. 4 ("Thou wretched, rash, 
intruding fool, farewell!  I took thee for thy better."), Hamlet would not have been excused. Murder 
is "purposely or knowingly" causing "the death of another human being," MODEL PENAL CODE, 
supra note 55 §§ 2 10. 1( 1)  & 2 10.2(1)(a) (emphasis added), not any particular human being. On the 
other hand, had Claudius not perished from his own damned potion, see SHAKESPEARE, supra note 
58, act V, sc. 2, he may have been excused for murdering Gertrude--on the ground of accident, not 
mistake-when she drank the draught intended for Hamlet. See p. 1 14 n.28. 
1 1 8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION, supra note 56, § 5 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 
I ,  2001);  see also BIRKS, supra note 83, at 147 (writing that the relevant inquiry is the extent to 
which the transferor's "judgment was vitiated"). 
1 19. Compare p. 1 1 8  ("[C]ourts have allowed reversal even though the recipient's gain may 
not have been at the transferor's expense.") with p. 1 18 ("[A] transferor is not entitled to relief for 
mistake if the transferor has sustained no loss as a result of the mistake."). 
1 20. Pp. 1 19-20. In essence, relevance has collapsed into causation. P. 120. 
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party. Early cases rescinding contracts on the ground of mistake focused on 
mistakes about the nature of the transaction, the subject matter of the trans­
action, or identity of the other party to the contract (pp. 1 24-26). A mistake 
about some quality of the subject matter generally did not warrant rescis­
sion, unless the mistake changed the very nature of the subject matter. 1 2 1 
Contemporary courts have exhibited greater willingness to consider more 
types of mistakes than their forebears and significantly relaxed the relevance 
test to the point that "reversal is available for a mistake 'as to a basic as­
sumption on which the contract was made' " and no longer limited to 
situations in which the subject of the contract was a "different" thing or the 
parties did not intend to be bound to contract for what actually transpired.1 2 2  
An interesting aspect of courts' shift to a "basic assumption" analysis is its 
inherently subjective nature. 1 23 
As a general rule, contemporary courts persist in denying rescission for 
mistakes of value unless the mistake of value also affects a more fundamen­
tal element of consideration.1 24 Farnsworth complains: ''There is no sound 
reason why a flawed perception of reality . . .  should not be relevant merely 
because it results in a poor estimate of value. In a case such as [Sherwood v. 
Walker], the significance of a mistake as to 'quality' is that it affects 
'value' " (p. 1 30). While the distinction between "quality" and "value" is 
largely artificial (one can certainly imagine a case in which quality would be 
substantially different without affecting value), Farnsworth's suggestion that 
a mistake is irrelevant "merely because it results in a poor estimate of value" 
would be better phrased "merely because it solely results in a poor estimate 
of value." A mistake of value is not disqualifying; it is simply not sufficient 
unless it has "a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances." 1 25 
1 2 1 .  See, e.g., Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919, 923 (Mich. 1 887) ("[T]he mistake was not 
of the mere quality of the animal, but went to the very nature of the thing. A barren cow is substan­
tially a different creature than a breeding one."). 
1 22. P. 1 27 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 6 § 1 52). 
1 23. As Farnsworth explains: 
The tenninology 'basic assumption on which the contract was made' looks to whether the mis­
take affected the fundamental expectations of the parties . . . .  The inquiry, like that into 
causation, is one into a purely subjective matter of fact. . . .  But while the inquiry as to causa­
tion focuses only on the party seeking to avoid for mistake, the inquiry as to relevance focuses 
on the understandings of both parties. 
P. 129. 
1 24. See, e.g., Moratzka v. Loop Corp. (In re Health Risk Mgmt., Inc.), 3 19 B.R. 1 8 1 ,  187  
(Bankr. D.  Minn. 2005); Gardner v .  Tyson (In re Gardner), 2 1 8  B.R. 338, 348 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1998); Gartner v. Eikill, 3 1 9  N.W.2d 397, 399 (Minn. 1982); Knutson v. Bitterroot Int'! Sys., Inc., 
2000 MT 203, 'll'l[ 24-27, 5 P.3d 554, 559. 
1 25.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 6 § 152. As the Michigan Supreme 
Court explained nearly a century after Sherwood v. Walker: 
[T]he inexact and confusing distinction between contractual mistakes running to value and 
those touching the substance of the consideration serves only as an impediment to a clear and 
helpful analysis for the equitable resolution of cases in which mistake is alleged and 
proven . . . .  
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As was the case with mistaken transfers, the party seeking to rescind a con­
tract for mistake need not prove that the other party was unjustly enriched.1 2 6 
Only the party seeking relief from liability for an intentional crime or 
tort or from a mistaken transfer need have been mistaken at the relevant 
time. Will a unilateral mistake suffice to relieve a party from liability for a 
contract or other agreement? Traditionally, unless one party knew or had 
reason to know of the other's mistake, contract law only afforded relief 
when both parties were mistaken about the same basic assumption; other­
wise, the expectation interest of the unaware, unmistaken party could be 
upset by a mistake she did not share. 1 2' More recently, the tide began to tum 
in favor of excusing unilateral mistakes about a basic assumption that had an 
adverse material effect on the mistaken party-a development that Corbin 
endorsed,' 28 the Restatement (Second) of Contracts canonized,' 29 and numer­
ous courts have since adopted.130 While not unreservedly embracing 
alleviating unilateral mistakes, 131 Farnsworth defends them in the case of 
mistaken expressions. 132 Unfortunately, other than perhaps implicitly endors­
ing the lessons of Restatement (Second) of Contracts133 and Donovan v. RRL 
[W]e think the better-reasoned approach is a case-by-case analysis whereby rescission is [only] 
indicated when the mistaken belief relates to a basic assumption of the parties upon which the 
contract is made, and which materially affects the agreed performances of the parties. 
Lenawee County Bd. of Health v. Messerly, 331 N.W.2d 203, 209 (Mich. 1982). 
1 26. Pp. 1 3 1-33; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 6 § 152 cmt. c .  
1 27. See pp. 133-34 and sources cited therein. 
1 28. 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 608 ( 1960). 
1 29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 6 § 1 53. 
1 30. JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI & PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 9.27 (5th ed. 2003) (col­
lecting cases). 
1 3 1 .  See p. 1 35 ("[A)ll would agree that even if it is not essential that the mistake be shared, it 
is essential that the other party was aware of the significance attached by the mistaken person to the 
subject of the mistake."). The Restatement (Second) imposes no requirement that the nonmistaken 
party have been aware how important the subject of the mistake was to the mistaken party, see RE­
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 6 § 1 53, nor does the considerable body of 
domestic case law that has applied the Restatement (Second)'s test. Those cases that discuss the 
nonmistaken party's actual or constructive knowledge focus on knowledge of the mistake, not of the 
importance of the subject about which the mistaken party was mistaken. 
1 32. Farnsworth writes: 
Clerical errors are usually discovered sooner than judgmental errors . . . .  [R]eliance is often 
negligible . . .  [C)lerical errors are usually relatively easy to verify. There is force to the argu­
ment that there is "no need for . . . pushing through a contract tarnished by mistake, 
particularly so long as the promisee has not acted in reliance on its validity. 
Pp. 1 35-36 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Friedrich Kessler & Edith Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, 
Bargaining in Good Faith, and Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study, 77 HARV. L. REv. 401 ,  
429 ( 1964)). 
1 33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 6 § 153 (affording relief from 
an innocent unilateral mistake about a basic assumption that would have a material adverse effect on 
the agreed exchange of performances). 
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Corp. 134 by referring to them, Farnsworth does not expound on the desirabil­
ity of alleviating unilateral judgmental mistakes. 
What of mistakes of law? Criminal law pays great deference to the an­
cient maxim that "Ignorance of the law is no excuse." 13 5 Courts and 
commentators have justified criminal law's adherence to this credo on the 
grounds that ( 1 )  everyone should know the law, (2) criminal law "reflects 
common notions of morality," and (3) allowing criminal defendants to seek 
refuge in ignorance of the law would invite insincerity, which would be dif­
ficult to overcome because of the heightened burden of proof in criminal 
• 13 6 F rth ak . " th h f th 137 H prosecutions. arnswo t es issue w1 eac o ese arguments. e 
finds greater justification for the maxim in tort law.138 
lgnorantia juris non excusat traditionally applied to attempts to rescind 
an agreement or voluntary transfer based on a mistake of law. 139 Since the 
1930s, however, the disparate treatment between mistakes of law and mis­
takes of fact has been eroding, 1 40 although many courts still cling to the 
distinction 1 4 1  despite the fact that the Restatement and Restatement (Second) 
1 34. 27 P.3d 702, 7 1 6-24 (Cal. 2001 )  (holding that the sales price listed in a newspaper adver­
tisement for a particular automobile was mistaken, due to typographical and proofreading errors 
made by the newspaper's employees, excusing the seller from liability based on the incorrect price). 
135. See, e.g., State v. Surette, 876 A.2d 582, 585 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005); Wien v. State, 882 
A.2d 1 83, 190 (Del. 2005); State v. Jacobson, 697 N.W.2d 6 10, 615 (Minn. 2005). 
1 36. Pp. 139-42. See generally Atlas Realty Corp. v. House, 192 A. 564, 567 (Conn. 1937) 
("The familiar legal maxims, that everyone is pr�sumed to know the law, and that ignorance of the 
Jaw excuses no one, are founded upon public policy and in necessity, and the idea [behind] them is 
that one's acts must be considered as having been done with knowledge of the law, for otherwise its 
evasion would be facilitated and the courts burdened with collateral inquiries into the content of 
men's minds."). 
137. Pp. 140-41 ("[O]ne cannot possibly know all the law, and the maxim seems particularly 
arbitrary and harsh when applied to minor regulatory crimes involving conduct that is not inherently 
immoral . . . .  Furthermore, it is not always a simple matter to find the relevant criminal law." (em­
phasis added)). Moreover, "it is as easy . . .  to simulate ignorance of facts as of law" and "a man's 
knowledge of the law is [no] harder to investigate than many questions which are gone into." P. 142 
(quoting WILLIAM A. KEENER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACTS 91 ( 1893), and 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 48 ( 188 1)). 
138. P. 142 (quoting KEENER, supra note 1 37, at 91). 
139. See pp. 141-42. 
140. See pp. 143-45; see, e.g. , In re M.D., 42 P.3d 424, 436 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) 
("[M]istakes about a party's 'antecedent rights' which form the basis of an agreement [are] mistakes 
of fact which . . .  constitute grounds for avoidance."); Webb v. Webb, 301 S.E.2d 570, 575 (W. Va. 
1983) (acknowledging that a mistake of law does not normally permit the avoidance of an obliga­
tion, but recognizing an exception if "the mistake is mutual, or common to all parties to the 
transaction, and results in a written instrument which does not embody the 'bargained-for' agree­
ment of the parties"). 
Some states have codified the right to relief from contracts formed or transfers made under a 
mistake of Jaw. CAL. C1v. CODE §§ 1 566-67, 1576, 1 578 & 1689(b)(l) (West 1982); GA . CODE 
ANN. §§ 23-2-21 to -22 ( 1 982); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 28-2-40l( l )(e), -408 & -410 (2005); N.D. 
CENT. CODE §§ 9-03-01 to -03, -12 & -14 ( 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 ,  §§ 5 1-53, 64 & 64 
(1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 53-4-1 ,  -8 & -10 (1990). 
141 .  See, e.g., Mid-States Gen. & Mech. Contracting Corp. v. Town of Goodland, 8 1 1 N.E.2d 
425, 435 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (refusing to recognize a party's right to rescind due to a mistake of 
law absent fraud, duress, or other untoward conduct); Burggraff v. Baum, 720 A.2d 1 167, 1 169 (Me. 
1430 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104: 1407 
of Contracts and the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrich­
ment repudiate the law-fact distinction. 1 42 Courts sometimes struggle with 
law-fact distinction, 143 and even those that have abandoned the distinction in 
most instances continue to refuse to excuse certain mistakes of law. 144 As a 
general proposition, however, contemporary courts are more willing to ex­
cuse mistakes of law in contractual and quasi-contractual transactions than 
were their forebears. 
E. Types of Relief 
Farnsworth distills the relief available for (alleviable) alleviating mis­
takes into two principal remedies: reversal and forgiveness. Reversal­
legally undoing the mistaken act or decision-is Farnsworth's preferred 
remedy for a mistake that causes a party to enter into a consensual transac­
tion, such as a contract or transfer of money by will, trust, or deed (pp. 12-
'16). Farnsworth prefers forgiveness-escaping legal responsibility for one's 
mistake-for a mistake that causes a party to commit an intentional offense, 
such as a tort or crime.145 Farnsworth likens alleviating mistakes that are eli­
gible for reversal or forgiveness to H.L.A. Hart's "invalidating" and 
"excusing" mistakes, respectively. 1 4 6  Farnsworth explains: "Relief in the case 
of an 'invalidating' mistake involves reversing the effect of the action that 
caused the untoward consequence . . . .  Relief in the case of an 'excusing' 
mistake consists of forgiveness of the action that caused the untoward con­
sequence" (pp. 1 2-13). 
Reversal is easy enough to understand for one versed in the law of con­
tracts or in equity, in which reversal typically manifests as rescission or 
reformation.1 47 Examples abound of courts rescinding contracts, instruments, 
1998) (same); Foster v. Carolina Marble & Tile Co., 5 1 3  S.E.2d 75, 78 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (same); 
Oak Hills Prop. v. Saga Rest., Inc., 940 S.W.2d 243, 246 (Tex. App. 1997) (same). 
1 42. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 502 illus. 4 (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS, supra note 6 § 1 5 1  cmt. b; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION, supra note 56 § 5 
cmt. g. 
1 43. Pp. 145-46 (discussing courts' disturbing tendency to treat mistaken contract interpreta­
tion as a mistake of law). 
1 44. P. 147 (discussing the specific example of time-barred claims for restitution of debts paid 
and then concluding, more generally, that "[s]uch exceptions remain because of particular consid­
erations, not because of a general distinction between mistakes of fact and those of law"). 
1 45. Pp. 1 2, 1 6-17. Forgiveness also manifests in contract law and equity when circumstances 
change after the parties form their agreement or one or both parties begin to perform some act for 
the benefit of the other. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ' supra note 6 §§ 261-65 & 
269-72. However, a flawed perception regarding as-yet-unchanged circumstances is a mispredic­
tion, not a mistake. See supra text accompanying notes 27-32. 
1 46. P. 12 (quoting HART, supra note 1 10, at 29-30, 34). 
1 4  7. Farnsworth discusses reformation-modifying the parties' rights and obligations to better 
accord with their (reasonable) ex ante expectations-as a form of reversal rather than as a distinct 
remedy for an alleviating mistake. Pp. 14, 79-8 1,  101--03. He explains that reformation is, in es­
sence, undoing the original instrument and then remaking it in accordance with the parties' 
expectations. P. 1 4. A party seeking reformation must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, see 
supra note 89, that the agreement or transfer at issue was entered into or undertaken because of a 
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or transfers because of a mistake. 1 48 Likewise, courts frequently reform a 
written contract or other instrument that fails to accurately reflect the par­
ties' or maker's intent. 1 49 Reversal translates much more poorly into criminal 
and tort law. A bullet fired into someone-the intended target or not­
cannot be unfired. A slip of the surgeon's scalpel cannot be reversed. Mali­
cious words, once publicly uttered, cannot be unspoken. The harm caused 
by the bullet, the scalpel, or the wicked tongue may be repaired but not 
avoided. When a mistaken party seeks reversal, Farnsworth contends "the 
result is generally all or nothing-the law either grants reversal or denies 
any relief whatsoever" (p. 13). This conclusion seems too cut and dried 
given the prospect of equitably reforming a contract or other transaction to 
comport with the parties' actual or reasonable expectations. 150 
Forgiveness is trickier. A party may seek forgiveness because (1) he did 
not intend to do what he did; (2) his intent to do what he did was based on 
the mistaken assumption that he had the legal right to do it; or (3) his flawed 
perception of reality caused his intended act to result in unintended conse­
quences.1 5 1 If a mistaken party seeks forgiveness, Farnsworth again contends 
that the result "is generally all or nothing-the law either grants forgiveness 
or denies any relief whatsoever and does not proffer partial relief that miti­
gates the accountability for an intentional offense" (p. 17). However, unlike 
cases in which reversal relieves a mistaken party of any liability, forgiveness 
often leaves open the possibility of liability for a lesser criminal offense or a 
tort that does not require the same mens rea that the party's mistake ne-
d 15 2 gate . 
IV. COUNTERVAILING CONCERNS 
I'd rather make the mistake of believing her than the bigger one of 
not. is3 
Neither reversal nor forgiveness comes without costs. Reversal infringes 
on finality, which "protect[s] the justified expectations of contracting 
flawed perception of reality and that the proposed reformation is the agreement or transfer that it 
would have undertaken had it not been for the misperception. P. 101 .  
1 48. E.g. , Pa. Tpk. Comm'n v.  K&S Trucking LLC, 362 F. Supp. 2d 598, 604--05 (E.D. Pa. 
2005); Barber v. Barber, 878 So. 2d 449, 45 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); Villanueva v. Amica Mut. 
Ins. Co., 864 A.2d 428, 431-32 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005); Millheiser v. Wallace, 21 P.3d 752, 
755 (Wyo. 2001 ). 
149. E.g. , Peterson v. First State Bank, 737 N.E.2d 1226, 1 230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); Miller v. 
Seibt, 788 N.Y.S.2d 1 26, 1 27-28 (App. Div. 2004); Laredo Med. Group v. Lightner, 153 S.W.3d 70, 
73-74 (Tex. App. 2004). 
1 50. See, e.g. , In re Owens Coming, 291 B.R. 329, 334 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (reforming a 
contract for sale that could not be rescinded due to the nonmistaken party's use of the goods); 
Herrmann v. Lindsey, 1 36 S.W.3d 286 (Tex. App. 2004) (affirming the trial court's reformation of, 
and refusal to rescind, a deed). 
1 5 1 .  See p. 1 6. 
1 52. See p. 17 .  
1 53. THE INTERPRETER (Universal 2005). 
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parties" and "assur[ es] the resulting property rights" of transfer recipients. 1 54 
Forgiveness infringes on accountability, which protects society from "those 
whose conduct is deemed culpable" and compensates individuals "for harm 
inflicted on them or their interests" by another's tortious conduct (p. 17). 
Nonetheless, finality and accountability will yield to a more compelling 
claim for reversal or forgiveness. How compelling such a claim is may de­
pend on one or more of the following considerations. 
A. Risk155 
A party's ability to reverse, or be forgiven for, a mistake may tum on 
whether she assumed the risk of mistake (p. 149). Risk counterbalances 
relevance. Relevance "seeks to protect the parties' actual expectations," 
whereas risk accounts for the parties' reasonable expectations (p. 150). 
Both the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Restatement (Third) 
of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment generally deny relief to a party that 
assumes the risk of mistake. 1 5 6  A party may assume the risk of a mistake by 
h f & 1 57 b . l" . 1 58 t e express terms o a contract or trans1er, y imp icat10n, or as a matter 
of law. 1 59 Most contracts and instruments of transfer do not expressly allo­
cate the risk of mistake, 160 and courts are not always receptive to those that 
try to do so (p. 1 52). The facts supporting implied risk assumption often 
resemble those that would also support a finding of no mistake based on 
conscious ignorance. 1 6 1  Fortunately, Farnsworth argues, both Restatements 
154. P. 1 6. The latter argument makes perfect sense; the former seems suspect. The underlying 
goal of contract law is to give effect to the intent of the parties at the time they entered into their 
agreement, not to protect the windfall realized or realizable by one party as a result of the other 
party's mistake at the time they entered into their agreement. 
155. Farnsworth uses "risk" to mean responsibility for, rather than probability of, a mistake. P. 
149. 
156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 6, §§ 152( 1 )  & 1 53; RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION, supra note 56, § 5(2)(b). 
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 6, §§ 154(a); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION, supra note 56, § 5(3)(b); see, e.g., Dickerson v. Williams, 956 P.2d 458, 
466 (Alaska 1998); Gloucester Landing Assocs. v. Gloucester Redev. Auth'y, 802 N.E.2d 1 046, 
1055 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004). 
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 6, §§ 1 54(b); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION, supra note 56, § 5(3)(b)-(c); see, e.g. , Moratzka v. Loop Corp. (In re 
Health Risk Mgmt., Inc.), 3 1 9  B.R. 1 8 1 ,  1 88 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005) (holding that a party who 
reserved the right to perform due diligence prior to being bound assumed the risk of mistake when it 
elected to proceed without the due diligence); Geodyne Energy Income Prod. P'ship I-E v. Newton 
Corp., 161  S.W.3d 482, 491 (Tex. 2005) (holding that a purchaser by quitclaim deed assumed the 
risk that the transferor's interest was not unblemished). 
159. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 6, §§ 154(c); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF RESTITUTION, supra note 56, § 5(3)(a); see, e.g., Estate of Nelson v. Rice, 1 2  P.3d 238, 
242 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (finding the trial court's decision to allocate the risk of mistake to the 
appellant reasonable under the circumstances). 
160. P. 1 5 1  ("[C]ontracting parties rarely focus their thoughts on the possibility of mis­
take . . . .  In sharp contrast to the frequent use of force majeure clauses to allocate the risk of 
misprediction, provisions specifically allocating the risk of mistake are . . .  relatively uncommon."). 
1 6 1 .  See p. 153; supra text accompanying notes 46--54. 
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treat entering into a consensual transaction with conscious ignorance as a 
mistake, the risk of which the uninformed party generally bears, rather than 
as a decision from which there is no possibility of relief for mistake.1 6 2 In 
general, deciding whether a party has assumed the risk of a mistake, rather 
than whether she has made a mistake at all, encourages a court to ask 
whether placing the risk on the mistaken party is consistent with the parties' 
legitimate expectations and requires a court to balance competing interests 
for which, in cases of conscious ignorance, it otherwise need not account.1 63 
In criminal and tort law, "the role of risk is often expressed in the form 
of a notion that wrongdoers . . . 'take the risk of their conduct tumin? out 
worse than they expected.' "164 Criminal law's "felony murder" rule1 6 and 
tort law's "egg-shell skull" rule166 are two well-known examples. Farnsworth 
complains that the Restatement (Second) of Torts addresses the latter by 
making a tortfeasor's knowledge of-and, therefore, mistake about-the 
injured party's susceptibility to injury irrelevant, rather than making it a 
relevant fact about which the tortfeasor bears the risk of mistake, as Richard 
Epstein and others have suggested.1 67 An unabashed (pun intended) rule of 
risk assumption can be found in defamation law: one who utters a defama­
tory statement for the purpose of injuring another is tortiously liable even if 
the defamatory statement proves to be mistaken (p. 160). As for criminal 
law, while the "felony murder" rule is clearly couched in terms of risk, 1 68 
Farnsworth complains that common law rules of grading offenses disin­
genuously recast what should be a question of risk assumption as a question 
of (ir)relevance (pp. 1 6G-61).  The Model Penal Code, by contrast, relieves 
an offender of greater liability than he would incur "had the situation been 
h 1 69 as e supposed." 
162. See p. 1 53; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 6, §§ 1 54(b); RESTATE­
MENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION, supra note 56, § 5(3)(c). 
1 63. Id. 
1 64. P. 1 58 (quoting GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 9.3.3, at 723 
( 1 978)). 
1 65. See, e.g., State v. Griffin, 1 12 P.3d 862, 870, 877-79 (Kan. 2005); Commonwealth v. 
Prater, 725 N.E.2d 233, 241-43 (Mass. 2000); State v. Thacker, 1 64  S.W.3d 208, 223-24 (Tenn. 
2005). 
1 66. See, e.g. , Bushong v. Park, 837 A.2d 49, 55 (D.C. 2003); Wilkinson v. Lee, 617 N.W.2d 
305, 308-10 (Mich. 2000); Ketteler v. Daniel, 556 N.W.2d 623, 630 (Neb. 1996). 
1 67. P. 159; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 16 & illus. 1 ( 1965); RICHARD A. EP­
STEIN, TORTS §§ 1 .2 & 1 .4.2 (1999). Farnsworth's point is well taken. However, section 16 only 
addresses intentional torts. Section 46 1 is its negligence counterpart. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS supra § 461 .  While Farnsworth's discussion of the "egg-shell skull" rule is limited to 
intentional harms, the rule clearly applies to injuries caused by negligence as well. The Restatement 
(Third) of Tons reorients and expands the rule so that the new provision clearly applies to both in­
tentional and negligent harm and extends from unforeseen harm due to an unknown physical 
condition to unforeseeable harm due to any unknown condition. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: PHYSICAL HARM, supra note 1 1 3, § 31 & cmt. a. 
1 68. E.g. , MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.3 16 (West 2004); People v. Patterson, 778 P.2d 
549, 55 1 (Cal. 1989) (en bane); Commonwealth v. Gamer, 795 N.E.2d 1202, 1 21�1 1 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 2003). 
1 69. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 55, § 2.04(2); see also p. 1 6 1 .  
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B. Fault 
While both "commonsense justice" and efficiency-based jurisprudence 
argue that a party whose mistake is its own fault should not be afforded the 
same relief as an innocently mistaken party, Farnsworth finds little evidence 
that courts deny or restrict relief based on a mistaken party's fault (pp. 1 84-
85). In criminal law, Farnsworth sees reasonableness as the obverse of fault 
(that is, the more reasonable the mistake, the less likely the defendant was at 
fault in acting on it)--despite the fact that courts and legislatures have de­
fined the intent required for most crimes so that reasonableness is irrelevant 
(pp. 1 87-88). The consent defense to rape is a notable exception. Numerous 
courts have required that the accused have a reasonable belief that the vic­
tim consented to sexual intercourse. 17° Farnsworth attributes criminal law's 
general reluctance to excuse only reasonable mistakes to the availability of 
"fall-back" liability in the form of lesser criminal offenses or tort liability (p. 
189). Likewise, he argues, fall-back negligence liability explains courts' 
reluctance to excuse only reasonable mistakes by those sued for intentional 
torts (pp. 1 89-90). Farnsworth finds tort and criminal law to be more at­
tuned to the mistaken party's fault if fall-back liability is either 
unsatisfactory, as in the case of rape, or unavailable, as in the case of tor-
• 17 1 tious trespass. 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts advocates a no-fault approach to 
mistakes, except when the mistaken party already bore the risk of mistake or 
where his fault breaches his duty of good faith and fair dealing. 17 2 Farns­
worth finds that courts tend toward this no-fault approach, except in a small 
number of cases in which a court denies equitable relief based on the fault 
of the party seeking it. 173 Similarly, the Restatement (Third) of Restitution 
and Unjust Enrichment advocates ignoring fault'74--despite a raft of law and 
economics scholarship advocating rules that create incentives for cautious 
transferors 175-except in cases in which the party seeking restitution con­
ferred a nonmonetary benefit. 17 6 
170. P. 1 88; see, e.g., Napoka v. State, 996 P.2d 106, 108 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000); People v. 
Stitely, 108 P.3d 1 82, 208 (Cal. 2005); State v. Koperski, 578 N.W.2d 837, 846 (Neb. 1 998). Statu­
tory rape appears to be an exception to this exception: the reasonableness of the defendant's belief 
about the victim's age is generally irrelevant. See, e.g., Neal v. State, 590 S.E.2d 168, 172 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2003); Commonwealth v. Dennis, 784 A.2d 179, 1 82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001). 
1 7 1 .  Pp. 1 89-9 1 ;  see, e.g. , Alaska Placer Co. v. Lee, 553 P.2d 54, 58 (Alaska 1 976); Nichols 
v. Georgia Television Co., 552 S.E.2d 550, 552 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). But see, e.g., Baker v. New­
comb, 621 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Mo. Ct. App. 1 98 1 )  ("A party is liable in trespass even though acting 
under a mistaken belief of law or fact, however reasonable."). 
172. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, supra note 6, § 157. 
173. P. 192; see, e.g. , Bert Allen Toyota, Inc. v. Grasz, 909 So. 2d 763, 769-70 (Miss. Ct. App. 
2005) (refusing to rescind a contract due to a computational error by the party seeking rescission, 
which it could have detected "in the exercise of reasonable care"). 
174. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION, supra note 56, § 5 cmt. f. 
175. See pp. 192-94 (collecting sources). 
176. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION, supra note 56, § 9(2). 
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C. Other Countervailing Concerns 
While "[c]laims to forgiveness are confined by considerations of rele­
vance, risk, and fault," 177 a mistaken party's bid to reverse an alleviating 
mistake may fail because of some unmistaken party's interest. After briefly 
discussing the public's interests in judicial and fiscal efficiency and finality 
(pp. 1 66-67), Farnsworth turns to the private interests of parties to, and 
those affected by, contracts and transfers. Third parties' interests may be 
upset by reversing a contract or transfer for mistake, 178 as may the mistaken 
party's interest in the reputational value of her promises (pp. 167-68). 
Farnsworth, however, focuses his attention on the effects of reversing a con­
tract or transfer on the unmistaken promisee or grantee. 
The parties, like the public, have an interest in finality. But unlike the 
public's interest, which Farnsworth describes as rooted in avoiding the costs 
of (re-)litigation, the parties' finality interest derives from the expectations 
they form based on a contract or transfer and their justifiable reliance on 
those expectations (pp. 168-78). Proving reliance on a mistaken transfer is 
generally easier than proving reliance on a contractual mistake because the 
former more typically involves the transferee acting in reliance, 179 while the 
latter more typically involves the promisee refraining from acting. 180 
V. CONCLUSION 
I'd like to make an offer on the house. This is what I can pay, 
minus the work on the place and a rental car to drive off a cliff 
when this all turns out to have been a terrible mistake. 181 
Mistakes are ubiquitous in law, as in life, and the excuses offered to re­
lieve a mistaken party from civil or criminal liability are manifold. In what 
proved to be his final book, Allan Farnsworth turned his formidable analyti­
cal skills, encyclopedic knowledge, intellectual curiosity, and sense of 
humor (including his choice of Edvard Munch's The Scream to adorn the 
book's dust cover) to the task of, to paraphrase his former colleague and 
1 77. P. 1 65. Farnsworth elaborates: "[l]f a mistake is relevant, so that one would otherwise be 
entitled to forgiveness for a tort or a crime, one does not have to contend with the argument that 
alleviation is precluded by [a countervailing] concern of the victim." P. 1 68. But, what of victims' 
rights? See generally Paul G. Cassell, Recognizing Victims in the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce­
dure: Proposed Amendments in Light of the Crime Victims ' Rights Act, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 835, 
840-52. 
1 78. See p. 167; see, e.g. , United States v. Certain Parcels of Land in Riverside County, Cal., 
67 F. Supp. 780, 807--08 (S.D. Cal. 1946). 
1 79. See pp. 170-77; see, e.g., Geller v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 237 F. Supp. 2d 210, 223 
(E.D.N.Y. 2002); Wachovia Bank of S.C., N.A. v. Thomasko, 529 S.E.2d 554, 556 (S.C. Ct. App. 
2000). 
1 80. See pp. 176--77. That said, one can find examples of contracting parties avoiding rescis­
sion because they justifiably relied to their detriment on their contracting partner's mistake. See, 
e.g., Talladega City Bd. of Educ. v. Yancy, 682 So. 2d 33, 35-36 (Ala. 1 996); Loyalty Life Ins. Co. 
v. Fredenberg, 632 N.Y.S.2d 901 ,  902--03 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). 
1 8 1 . UNDER THE TuscAN SUN (Touchstone Pictures 2003). 
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co-author Carol Sanger, exploring the law's relationship to human error and 
forgiveness. 18 2 Farnsworth's exploration was unfinished; it is up to us to con­
tinue the journey. 
1 82. Carol Sanger, Remarks for Al/an Famswonh Memorial, 105 CoLUM. L. REv. 1432, 1435 
(2005). Professor Sanger also relates a humorous anecdote about Professor Farnsworth's first choice 
for the title of this book and his characterization of the publisher's response. Id. at 1434. 
